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The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the 
annual joint seminars that since a few years the 
Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for 
International Relations organise in Moscow 
and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot 
interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that 
is more than ever necessary in a world of 
increasing tensions between the great powers. 
We continue our collaboration through this 
joint publication, therefore, for which we have 
invited prominent scholars from Russia and 
the European Union as well as China and the 
United States to share their analysis of the 
impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US 
presidential elections on international politics. 
 
SCARCITY AND STRATEGY: THE FOREIGN 
POLICY OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION   
BARRY R. POSEN 
 
Bernard Brodie, one of the progenitors of post-
cold war strategic studies used to say that 
“strategy wears a dollar sign”. States have many 
foreign and security policy goals from which to 
choose. But resources of every kind are always 
scarce. It is the task of strategy to set priorities for 
the allocation of scarce resources. Though policy 
analysts across the world are trying to guess what 
will be the contours of the Biden 
Administration’s grand strategy, statements alone 
do not get us very far. A fundamental question is 
whether he and his advisors perceive resource 
scarcity or resource plenty. Below I make some 
guesses based on the assumption that they see a 
world of scarcity. 
 
What kinds of scarcity does the Administration 
face? First is a scarcity of extant military 
resources. With a defence budget of $700 billion 
per year one wonders how such resources could 
be scarce. But they are. Modern military power is 
enormously costly to purchase and to operate. A 
casual reading of the US military press suggests 
that the US force has been worked too hard in 
the last two decades. It is for this reason that one 
now hears that the Pentagon plans to focus anew 
on great power wars. The implication is that 
turning away from nation-building and counter-
insurgency will free resources to contain Russia 
and China. But Russia and China are not minor 
 
 





military competitors. And though it seems 
possible that Russia will have a difficult time 
sustaining its recent military improvements, 
China has barely scratched the surface of what it 
can do. Extant military resources are already 
scarce.   
 
Second, the Administration faces a scarcity of 
money. Though there are certainly western 
economists who claim that advanced economies 
can continue to borrow vast sums not only to 
fight and recover from the pandemic, but to 
address climate change and income inequality, 
there are others who would say that this cannot 
go on forever. Even if the Democrats take the 
Senate, it is unlikely that they will be comfortable 
simply adding to the deficit both to fix the US, 
and to continue to defend all the extended 
ramparts of the “US-led liberal world order”.  
Biden has won the Presidency largely on Donald 
Trump’s failure to look after the US public. 
Fighting the pandemic, and then fixing the 
economy will be job No. 1 for Biden. 
 
Third, despite the President’s convincing double 
victories in the popular and the electoral votes, he 
nevertheless faces a scarcity of political capital. 
The American politics pundits agree: his coattails 
were short. There was no blue wave to bring him 
deep political reserves of support in the House 
and Senate and in the State legislatures.  Donald 
Trump’s total popular vote was the second 
greatest in US history, Biden’s total the first. 
President Biden will need to husband his political 
capital. He will spend it on the issues that will 
yield him the greatest political support, and those 
are domestic. 
 
If President elect Biden and his advisors see these 
constraints, how might it affect what they actually 
do? Even a casual reading of Biden’s March 2020 
Foreign Affairs article “Why America Must Lead 
Again”, suggests that US internal problems loom 
large: fixing up the US polity, society, and 
economy consumes the first half of the article. 
And anyone who paid much attention to the 
recent presidential campaign would have noticed 
that foreign policy played a minor role. The 
principal discussion was about which candidate 
would be harder on China. This gives us a hint as 
to where the major overseas priority of the 
Administration will be – Asia, because the 
candidates vied with one another expressing a 
hard line. Polling data (if such can be quoted with 
a straight face in the US, after the predictive 
failures of the last two presidential campaigns) 
suggests that the public is quite concerned about 
China, though some have economic concerns 
while others have security concerns. Containing 
China is popular in both the Democratic and 
Republican parties. As Biden wants to work with 
Republicans, the containment of China may be 
the path of least resistance to some bipartisan 
policy successes. China’s rise would be a serious 
security matter even if the American public were 
not interested. A focus on China in US foreign 
and security policy, to include trade and 
technology, is thus almost inevitable. And given 
the size of the China challenge, and the scarcity 
of security resources, there is not going to be 
much left for anything else. 
 
The rest of America’s allies should take some 
comfort from a return to normalcy at least in 
terms of the US foreign policy process. But allies 
in Europe and the Middle East should take note. 
Sure, the Biden administration will work 
multilaterally on problems of collective concern, 
such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, and 
even trade. But it may not be long before those 
who hope for a return to the old days find 
themselves disappointed. President elect Biden 
says many nice things about the Transatlantic 
Alliance. But if scarcity is real, he will be looking 
for a better bargain. All agree that a European-US 
partnership to address the neo-mercantilist 
 
 





aspects of Chinese foreign policy would be of 
great help. The European Union would loom 
large in such a partnership, though Americans 
frankly do not quite understand the Union and 
how it works. But saying this does not make it so. 
Europeans will need to organize their own China 
strategy, and find areas of overlap with the US. 
Europe depends far more on international trade 
than does the US. It is likely that Europeans will 
need to make some hard choices about how hard-
nosed they wish to be on China, and these 
choices may not overlap with those of the US. 
Similarly, Europeans will notice, if they have not 
already noticed, that Asia is a magnet for US 
military resources. US interest in military burden-
sharing antedates President Trump, even if it was 
expressed more artfully. The situation is getting 
worse. The European members of NATO are, 
due to distance, inefficient contributors to the 
military containment of China. They are, 
however, potentially very efficient contributors 
to the containment of Russia. Expect continuing 
pressure to do more. 
 
Finally, what shall we expect of policy for the 
greater Middle East? Israel will be fine, but not 
the Palestinians. It is simply not worth the 
political cost for a US President to pressure Israel 
to do much of anything. As we move eastward, 
however, things get interesting. President elect 
Biden and his advisors seem to take climate 
change quite seriously. So do European 
statespersons. Sooner or later the fundamental 
question will arise: why should the US continue 
to commit blood and treasure to the Persian Gulf 
to defend a low price for the oil that we now 
know to be poisonous to the planet? And given 
an aroused progressive wing of the Democratic 
Party, why defend profoundly illiberal regimes 
that show no sign of reform whatsoever? Why 
defend a cartel that periodically fixes the price of 
oil in order to bankrupt US domestic producers, 
and put their employees out of work? There will 
be cross cutting pressures of course. Iran simply 
has no friends in the US and has no way to get 
any. Oil prices and supply will matter to 
prosperity in the west for perhaps another 
decade. The Arab petro-states effectively use the 
main tool at their disposal – money – to garner 
influence in Washington. But the gravitational 
pull of petroleum on policy is beginning to wane 
and US policy-makers will focus their attention 
elsewhere.  
 
These projections depend on Biden and his 
advisors’ perceptions of scarce resources. But 
perhaps resources will prove more plentiful than 
I imagine. The shortages of military, financial, 
and political capital discussed above could be 
evanescent. The US economy is quite resilient 
and innovative. Our opponents may prove less 
strong than they appear at present. The American 
public might at heart be as outward looking and 
internationalist as some pollsters contend, and 
never again support Trumpian transactionalism. 
The clever and well-resourced US military may 
come up with another wave of technological 
innovations that leave their opponents’ heads 
spinning. If these emerge quickly as the actual 
facts of the case, then US allies in Europe can 
return to the happy days of the late 1990s, when 
security was a free good provided by a benevolent 
hegemon at the helm of the liberal world order. 
But I would not bet on it. 
 
Dr. Barry R. Posen is Ford International 
Professor of Political Science at MIT,  and 
Director Emeritus of the MIT Security 
Studies Program.  He is the author of 
numerous articles and books, including 
“Europe Can Defend Itself”  (in: Survival, 
Vol. 62, 2020, No. 6), and Restraint: A New 
Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, (Cornell 









BIDEN’S GEOPOLITICAL FALLOUT FOR 
CHINA   
FENG ZHONGPING & HUANG JING 
 
No one will be surprised to learn that Beijing has 
been following the American election closely. 
Who is in the White House means a lot not only 
for Sino-US relations, but also for US policies 
toward Europe, Russia, and China’s neighbours. 
 
A Silver Lining for Sino-US Relations? 
Chinese decision-makers and think-tankers have 
been distressed by the unpredictability that 
Donald Trump brought to US foreign policy in 
the past four years. President-elect Joe Biden, 
who is a former US Vice-President and a foreign 
policy veteran, is deemed to be more predictable. 
Many of his advisers used to serve in the Barack 
Obama administration, while Biden himself has 
had numerous encounters with the Chinese 
leadership during his political career.  
 
But Beijing knows very well that President Biden 
will not stop the US from seeing China as a 
competitor. It is after all Barack Obama, the 
President that Biden served as Vice-President, 
who “pivoted to Asia”. Obama even claimed 
recently that “if we hadn’t been going through a 
financial crisis, my posture toward China would 
have been more explicitly contentious around 
trade issues”.  
 
The US will not change its strategic focus: dealing 
with the rise of China. The change will be in the 
approach. Trump’s key word is decoupling. What 
will be Biden’s? Biden will not go as far as 
decoupling. Nor will he go back to the old 
engagement policy. 
 
Presumably, Biden’s approach will be a 
moderated containment. He will work with allies, 
which will make his dealings with China easier, 
but also less blunt. He will not support the idea 
of an economic cut-off, but might seek 
decoupling in certain fields, such as technology, 
instead. He might rekindle the cooperation with 
Beijing on climate change and on regional 
hotspots such as North Korea, Iran, and 
Afghanistan.  
 
A Transatlantic Reset? 
Biden has received overwhelmed support across 
the Atlantic. Europeans are much more 
enthusiastic than China about the new president. 
Transatlantic policy might turn out to be one of 
the biggest policy changes after the power 
reshuffle in Washington.  
 
No doubt, Biden will try to strengthen 
transatlantic bonds once he is in office. His 
proposal of a Democracy Summit has already 
aroused much enthusiasm among US allies. His 
choice of Antony Blinken, whose ties to Europe 
are said to be lifelong, deep and personal, as his 
Secretary of State sends a strong signal. 
According to a think-tank speech in July, Blinken 
said: “China sees alliances as a core source of 
strength for the United States, something they 
don’t share and enjoy”.1 
 
Judging from Biden’s speeches during the 
campaign trail, the next US president will return 
to the Paris Agreement on climate change, a 
European pet project, and re-enter the US in 
many multilateral institutions that Trump has, or 
has threatened to, quit. Biden probably will listen 
to his European counterparts on the Iran nuclear 
deal, another European diplomatic feat that has 
been destroyed by Trump, and might even find 
ways to make a new one.  
 
Of course, Europe understands that Biden 
cannot change everything. The US presidential 
race was so close that although he has won the 
election, he represents only half of a divided 
nation. Not to mention that Biden will be 
 
 





hindered by partisan gridlock in Congress. 
Besides, Biden’s focus will be on domestic issues 
and China, not on Europe. In a word, Trumpism 
will somehow continue without Trump. 
 
Therefore, the Europeans hold steadfast to the 
ideal of strategic autonomy, a concept predating 
but much focused on during the Trump years. 
The geopolitical upheaval has left the Europeans 
with few choices at hand. Politicians in Brussels 
and in European capitals have vowed that 
Europe should not be reduced to a “playground” 
or a “colony”. Toward the end of Trump’s term, 
strategic autonomy became the loudest answer to 
the new geopolitical contingency.  
 
Though German officials might be a little bit less 
interested than their French friends in the 
concept of autonomy, as the recent spat between 
German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-
Karrenbauer and French President Emmanuel 
Macron on the American security umbrella has 
revealed,2 such schisms should not be overplayed. 
The Europeans will find no difficulty to get past 
this difference about the meaning of words. As 
Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, put on his 
blog: “a capable and strategically aware Europe is 
the best partner for the US – and also what 
Europe itself needs”. 3  
 
In his call to Biden in November 23, European 
Council President Charles Michel identified the 
following fields to cooperate: the COVID-19 
pandemic, economic recovery, climate change, 
security, and multilateralism.4 But observers from 
the rest of the world might be more interested to 
see how the two sides solve their trade and digital 
disputes as a start.   
 
New thinking on China’s neighbourhood? 
After the election, Biden’s first official call to 
foreigners was made to the Canadian Prime 
Minister, on 9 November. The next day, he called 
the UK, Ireland, Germany, and France. The day 
after, he called Japan, South Korea, and Australia. 
Such an order might say something about Biden’s 
regional priorities in terms of alliances.  
 
The Obama administration used to woo Asian-
Pacific countries with a free trade zone, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). 
Nevertheless, Trump withdrew from TPP within 
the first week of taking office, and the remaining 
TPP members have tried to save the agreement 
as CPTPP, or Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Biden 
might consider going back to a revised CPTPP.   
 
His interest might increase when considering the 
announcement of the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 15 November 
by 15 Asian-Pacific countries, as well as Chinese 
president Xi Jinping’s subsequent publicly 
declared interest in joining CPTPP. “The RCEP 
deal shows quite conclusively that the Trump 
Administration’s strategy to isolate China and to 
cut it off from global value chains has failed”, as 
a European observer aptly put.5 
 
If Biden meets with domestic resistance against 
joining a trade agreement with the region, he will 
have to think hard about how to assure US allies 
such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, 
and Japan, who are concerned about China’s 
rising influence, but meanwhile also continue to 
work for closer economic ties with the 
powerhouse. 
 
For Biden, it is easier to deal with another Trump 
legacy in the region, namely, the Indo-Pacific 
Strategy, with an increasingly active security 
Quad (comprising the US, Japan, India, and 
Australia) at its centre. 
 
India is a very important neighbour of China. In 
 
 





2017, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, a sign of its good relationship with 
China and Russia. But 2020 has seen the outbreak 
of clashes on the Sino-Indian border, and waves 
of clamping down on Chinese apps on the Indian 
market. Things could have been better without 
the Quad or the US’ global campaign against 
Chinese technology, some Chinese strategists 
think.  
 
Compared to Trump, Biden might be a little bit 
more critical toward India. Actually, he called the 
Indian leader five days later than his calls with 
Japan and Australia. Though Biden will carry 
ahead the Indo-Pacific Strategy, his more 
balanced approach toward India might help 
China and India to better navigate their disputes.  
 
A Bitter Russia? 
Four years ago, Russia was among the happiest to 
seen Donald Trump elected. Russia hoped that 
an anti-establishment US president would change 
Russia’s post-Cold War strategic impasse. 
Nevertheless, due to the deeply entrenched 
animosity toward Russia in the US establishment, 
Trump was not able to visit Russia or to receive 
the Russian leader on American soil even once, 
let alone to change US policy on Russia – the 
ongoing sanctions because of Russia’s annexation 
of the Crimea in 2014 are a useful reminder. For 
Russia, Trump is a lost opportunity.  
 
It seems that the Kremlin is very reluctant to 
congratulate Biden with his victory. The 
Democrats have long held a negative perception 
of Russia. The recent revision of the Russian 
constitution and the turbulence in Belarus might 
perpetuate this perception.  
 
Two Blocs? 
Will a more cooperative US president draw US 
allies together against another bloc led by China? 
First, such a prospect seems not on Biden’s wish 
list. Second, it simply does not work. 
 
In the past four years, US allies already tried to 
cooperate on issues related to China, sometimes 
along with the US, sometimes not. For example, 
Europe and Canada have a very good 
cooperation record on climate change; Europe 
and Japan have worked consistently on WTO 
reform; France and Germany have resorted to 
Australia on their Indo-Pacific strategies. But the 
cooperation has been case-by-case. 
 
US allies have their own interests. Some 
European think-tankers urge the EU to “learn 
from Japan’s adept economic diplomacy”. Japan 
has navigated successfully between China and the 
US, striking trade deals with both as well as with 
the EU, they argue.6 
 
Europe will not do everything on US terms. In 
terms of the economy, Europe and the US are 
competitors. The common challenge of the 
China Model might push Europe and the US 
closer on economic issues. However, Europe 
does not just see China as a strategic rival. The 
EU’s definition of China is a more complicated 
one, mixing partner, competitor, and rival. 
Europe will continue to engage China. 
 
Furthermore, global issues such as climate change 
and the pandemic might lead to wide cooperation 
among China, the US, Europe, and many others. 
China’s pledge of net-zero emission by 2060 has 
already cleared a path for a good start. 
 
Prof. Dr. Feng Zhongping is the Vice-
President of the China Institutes of 
Contemporary Relations (CICIR). Dr. Huang 
















1. Narratives  
Russian leadership tried hard to avoid any 
statements that would indicate its preference for 
Donald Trump. Still, it is clear that the election of 
Joe Biden does not quite fit into the official 
Russian narrative on the contemporary 
international system. Biden’s predecessor in the 
White House with his explicit nationalistic, 
unilateralist, and transactional approach to 
foreign policy, was regarded in Moscow as a 
graphic manifestation of prevailing global trends 
away from globalization, value-based politics, and 
Western hegemony.  If Biden is at least partially 
successful in his attempts to restore 
multilateralism and Western solidarity and to 
promote a global shift to a new cycle of 
globalization, his success will be a blow to the 
image of the world that the Russian leadership 
likes to present. A new consolidation of the West, 
no matter how temporary, is at odds with the 
official Kremlin narrative about the inexorable 
movement of the international system toward a 
polycentric world order. Worse still, it might give 
the collective West new confidence. In addition, 
a new reconciliation between the US and its 
traditional Western allies will be a major blow to 
the various Western populists and nationalists for 
whom Trump is a role model, and will tip the 
political scales against them. It will also hurt some 
of the Kremlin’s political partners abroad. A 
Biden victory can inject new life into proponents 
of the Western liberal values that Vladimir Putin 
has already written off as hopelessly obsolete. 
 
2. Priorities   
When the Democratic President finally gets 
down to his foreign policy agenda, it is not likely 
that the Russian portfolio will sit on top of it. The 
new US President is not obsessed with Moscow 
to the same extent as some Republicans were (e.g. 
late Senator John McCain). Joe Biden is more 
likely to focus on the transatlantic relations that 
were seriously damaged by his predecessor. 
Another burning matter is a trade agreement with 
China: it will not end the US-Chinese economic 
or technological competition, but can at least help 
to prevent a full-fledged trade war between 
Washington and Beijing.  In sum, Biden can allow 
himself to put most of the Russia files on a back 
burner, with the possible exception of the 
pending strategic arms control question. It 
implies that we will not see an early US-Russian 
summit in 2021; at best, the two leaders could 
meet on the margins of a multilateral event, like 
the G20 or APEC, to compare notes on issues of 
common interest.   
 
3. Attitude  
Donald Trump never drew a line between 
Vladimir Putin and Russia. He always argued that 
Putin was a very strong, skilled, and efficient 
leader, doing his best to advance Russia’s national 
interests. Joe Biden does not share this 
admiration for the Russian President; on the 
contrary, he seems to believe that Putin is a major 
contributor to the historic decline of Russia as a 
state and as a society.  In the eyes of Biden, 
Putin’s kleptocracy, political authoritarianism, the 
so-called “vertical of power”, and other specific 
features of his system constitute a major obstacle 
for Russia’s social and economic modernization. 
In Biden’s view, to be anti-Putin does not mean 
to be anti-Russian; on the contrary, fighting 
against Putin in the end is the best assistance to 
the Russian people that the US could possibly 
offer.  
 
4. Domestic Constraints  
The good news for US-Russian relations is the 
fact that so far US authorities have detected no 
significant Russian involvement in the election of 
2020. This does not necessarily mean that this 
 
 





matter will disappear completely from Biden’s 
radar screen, but it is not likely to affect the 
American domestic political agenda of 2021 as 
much as it did back in 2017. On the other hand, 
with Republicans in control of the Senate, Joe 
Biden will be significantly constrained in what he 
can do in foreign policy, the Russian dimension 
included. Capitol Hill will be in a position to play 
an active role in sanctions policy toward Russia, 
in the modernization of US nuclear forces, in 
limiting White House autonomy in matters like 
the JCPOA or in decisions related to the US 
military presence abroad. The influence of the 
legislative power on US-Russian relations is likely 
to be mostly negative, especially if Russia remains 
in some way an issue in US partisan politics.       
 
5. Human Rights  
The “bad side” of Biden for Russia will start 
manifesting itself in much harder and 
uncompromising rhetoric targeting the Russian 
leadership.  Since Joe Biden, unlike Donald 
Trump, is not a fan of Vladimir Putin, the former 
will not be shy to express his uncomplimentary 
views on the Russian leader. Moreover, Biden will 
pay more attention to human rights problems in 
Russia; he will extend more support to political 
opposition in Russia as well as to politicized civil 
society institutions. He will also demonstrate 
more sympathy for democratic states in the 
Russian neighbourhood, from Ukraine to 
Georgia (that might also include more active 
support for the democratic opposition in 
Belarus). US support of Kyiv is likely to grow, 
including various forms of military assistance.  
 
6. Sanctions  
Anti-Russian sanctions will undoubtedly remain 
one of the prime US policy instruments in dealing 
with Moscow. We will see more of them and the 
only question is whether the Biden 
Administration preserves the overall approach of 
the Trump Administration, or whether it will 
rather try to bring these sanctions to a new, much 
higher level. No doubt, there will be temptations 
to suffocate the Russian economy by imposing a 
comprehensive set of sanctions on Russia’s 
energy and financial sectors, and by treating 
Moscow the same way the US treated Tehran 
during the four Trump years. However, bringing 
sanctions to a new level would create too many 
risks for the global economic system in general 
and for the US economy in particular. It is not 
likely that the Biden Administration will be ready 
to take such risks, especially when it has to deal 
with so many other economic and financial 
challenges.      
 
7. Arms Control  
The Biden Administration is likely to be generally 
better than the Trump Administration. The 
President elect has never supported the 
irresponsible attitude of his predecessor to arms 
control at large or to bilateral US-Russian arms 
control in particular. He might well try to rescue 
the New START and to abide informally by the 
provisions of the INF, which the United States 
withdrew from in the summer of 2019. He is 
likely to pay more attention to the NPT, the 
CTBT, and other multilateral nuclear arms 
agreements that Trump did not consider of top 
importance for the US. However, this does not 
mean that bilateral US-Russian arms control has 
a bright future under Biden – any agreements 
beyond the New START will be very difficult to 
negotiate and to get ratified by the US side. Many 
fundamental disagreements between Moscow 
and Washington, on such issues as tactical 
nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence, 
engaging China and other nuclear powers, etc., 
will not disappear under the new administration. 
It is also clear that the Biden Administration will 
have to start reviewing and revising the old 
paradigm of strategic arms control, in order to 
catch up with the latest technological 
developments (space, cyber, AI, autonomous 
 
 





lethal systems, prompt strike, etc.).   
 
8. Regional Problems  
Another change in US foreign policy under Biden 
is that Russia can benefit from is the potential 
softening of the US position on Iran, and a more 
balanced US approach to the Middle East peace 
process. The Kremlin would undoubtedly 
welcome the US getting back to the JCPOA, or 
putting more emphasis on multilateral 
approaches to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. 
Unlike some of his colleagues in the Barack 
Obama administration, Joe Biden has always 
been quite sceptical about US military 
interventions abroad, and he actively opposed US 
engagement in Libya back in 2011. However, it is 
unlikely that the Biden Administration will 
actively seek collaboration with Moscow on 
Libya ten years later, or that it will seek more US-
Russian interaction in and around Syria. One can 
predict that Biden will be more persistent than 
Trump in accusing Russia of destabilizing actions 
in fragile states, primarily in Africa. It is also 
possible that the Biden Administration will 
exercise more pressure on Russia’s illiberal allies 
in Latin America (Venezuela, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua).  
 
9. Global Commons  
The decision of Biden to get the US back to the 
Paris agreements on climate change might open 
new opportunities for limited US-Russian 
cooperation in this domain. However, it remains 
unclear to what extent the Kremlin is ready to 
commit itself in a serious way to the global 
climate change agenda. Another area for 
cooperation on global commons is the Arctic 
region. In the spring of 2021, Russia takes the 
leadership of the Arctic Council and both sides 
are interested to keep this institution separated 
from the geopolitical competition in other 
regions of the world. This task does not look 
impossible to achieve, though there are risks of 
the Council turning into yet another podium for 
US-Russian political infighting.     
 
10. European Dimension  
A likely change in transatlantic relations will also 
have an impact on Russia’s foreign policy. Of 
course, the numerous political, economic, and 
strategic differences between Washington and 
Brussels will not just disappear, and certainly, 
there will be no return to the good old days of 
Barack Obama and Bill Clinton. Still, Biden, with 
his foreign policy experience and his inclination 
to compromise, will work diligently to restore 
transatlantic relations. Under Biden, we will likely 
see more flexibility from Washington on trade 
talks with the EU, more readiness to consider the 
EU’s opinion on US approaches to global 
problems, and increased attention to European 
positions on regional crises. A change of 
administration in the White House will likely 
reduce, though not eliminate, the EU’s interest in 
normalizing relations with Russia. Having agreed 
a truce on the western front, Brussels will be 
more than capable of swiftly transferring its 
forces to the eastern front, taking a harder line 
towards the Kremlin. A Democratic US 
President will likely applaud such a strategic 
move, seeing the standoff with Russia as a way of 
cementing the transatlantic partnership. In all 
likelihood, a Biden victory will severely limit 
Russia’s room for manoeuvre in its EU policy, 
and perhaps in its broader foreign policy too. A 
more united West might consolidate itself not 
only on an anti-Russian platform, but also, to a 
lesser degree, against China. 
 
11. Chinese Dimension  
The incoming Biden Administration might try to 
tear apart the Russian-Chinese strategic 
partnership by trying to cut a deal with either 
Russia or China and to focus on the remaining 
opponent. Biden can follow Donald Trump, who 
called for accommodating Moscow and 
 
 





confronting Beijing. Still, it is highly unlikely that 
Joe Biden can be more successful in pursuing this 
goal than his predecessor was. The US simply has 
nothing to offer to President Putin to make him 
reconsider his current close friendship with 
Chairman Xi Jinping – be it in the economic, 
political or strategic domain. Biden can play on 
the opposite side of the stage, seek an acceptable 
accommodation with the stronger Beijing, and 
put the squeeze on the weaker Moscow. 
However, in this case the Biden Administration 
will have to abandon its claim to global American 
leadership. Certainly, neither Biden nor his 
entourage are ready to do that, and Washington-
Beijing relations will remain complicated and 
tense. Even more importantly, just as Donald 
Trump saw repeatedly throughout the four years 
of his presidency that it was impossible to tear 
Russia away from China, Joe Biden will 
repeatedly see that China cannot be torn away 
from Russia. Beijing needs Moscow regardless of 
the current state of and prospects for China-US 
relations. Under the current circumstances a 
version of “dual containment” appears to be the 
most likely approach of this Administration 
towards Beijing and Moscow, with China being 
treated more as a peer competitor and Russia as 
a global rogue state. To cut the costs of dual 
containment, Biden will try to mobilize the US’ 
Western allies in Europe and in East Asia. It will 
also try to keep Eurasia divided by forging 
stronger ties to Chines adversaries in Asia – 
above all, to India.  
 
12. Diplomacy  
Biden may decide to stop the ongoing 
“diplomatic war” with Russia – he arguably 
values professional diplomacy much more than 
Trump did, and he is not likely to keep the 
Russian Embassy in Washington (and the US 
Embassy in Moscow) in the state of a besieged 
fortress. In general, Biden will delegate more 
authority and more power to foreign policy 
experts and professionals (“Deep State”) 
including those of them who will hold the Russia 
portfolio; therefore, US policy toward Russia is 
likely to be more consistent, realistic, and 
predictable.  Some of the now frozen diplomatic, 
military, and expert communication lines 
between the two countries are likely to be 
reactivated, which will also mitigate risks of an 
uncontrolled confrontation. However, this does 
not mean that the relationship will get much 
better.    
 
13. Beyond Biden  
Today we can only guess whether President 
Biden will serve his full first term in office or 
whether we may see him succeeded by Vice-
President Kamala Harris. It also remains to be 
seen what she has to contribute to US foreign 
policy in general and to US-Russia relations in 
particular. Still, any “re-set” in these relations 
looks very unlikely under either Biden or Harris. 
At best, one can foresee a very limited détente 
and a better management of the very difficult and 
mostly adversarial relationship. A real shift in this 
relationship might take place after the 
Presidential election of 2024, when new 
generations of political leaders replace the “old 
guard” in both countries.  These new generations 
are destined to have very different views of the 
world and of their respective country’s role in 
global affairs.    
 
Andrey Kortunov is the Director-General of 
the Russian International Affairs Council 
(RIAC), and a member of expert and 
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of several Russian and international 













EUROPE AFTER THE US ELECTIONS: 
BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE UNKNOWN  
ALEXEY GROMYKO 
 
Brussels, the established centre of the EU, Berlin, 
Paris, and other Member State capitals met the 
victory of Joseph Biden in a mood of uplift and 
cheering. The last four years with Donald Trump 
turned into the most difficult challenge 
transatlantic solidarity ever encountered. Trump 
became the personification, and a very rough one 
at that, of the US policy of strategic decoupling 
from the European allies of the last decades. For 
a long time this policy was an undeclared one, 
more an undercurrent then the waves raging on 
the surface. Before it was like grass growing 
slowly and quietly; with Trump it was thrown into 
stark relief. 
 
There were times when West Europeans 
themselves were musing on the virtues of going 
it alone. Then, before 2003 and immediately after, 
when the words “strategic autonomy” were not 
yet coined, Berlin, Paris, and numbers of 
influential British intellectuals urged their countries to 
acquire more foreign policy actorness, questioning 
the tradition of following the leader on the other 
shore of the pond no matter what. The 
intervention in Iraq and its aftermath were so 
surreal, indefensible, and bloody that many 
Europeans were prepared to decouple by themselves. 
However, the factor of Barack Obama stalled this 
process and streamlined the geopolitical moods 
in Europe. Still, for the unbiased observer the 
fundamentals did not change — the US kept 
drifting away from the Old World.  
 
In the years of the Obama presidency this drift 
got its name — “pivot to Asia”. In Russia it is 
called a “turn to the East”. No matter how we 
identify this geopolitical shift, in essence it 
reflects the objective process of the last 30 years 
— the ascendancy of Asia, first of all China, to 
the status of a new centre of power and a new 
axis of world politics.  
 
There is little for Europe to complain about. The 
euro-centrism of international relations became a 
thing of the past as far back as 1945. Some 
European empires were buried by the First World 
War, some by the Second, or they collapsed in its 
aftermath. Afterwards, for a long time Western 
Europe was in the shadow of two superpowers 
— the Soviet Union and the United States. Today 
world politics, the structure of which is not any 
more bipolar but polycentric, increasingly is 
revolving around interaction between China and 
the US. 
 
In spite of the ordeal for the US-European bonds 
of the Trump years, the traditional part of the 
Euro-Atlantic establishment, the Atlanticists, 
have preserved strong positions. They adhere to 
a vision of international affairs as defined by the 
West, understood as an alliance of (neo)liberal 
democracies led by the US.  
 
In parallel, in the last years another current in the 
EU political elites has been gaining strength — 
autonomists. These are those, mainly West 
European, who think that it is an urgent necessity 
to promote the vision of a more politically 
autonomous and independent European Union. 
The ideas of a common strategic culture have 
been spreading intensively, especially since 2016, 
and the structures of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy have solidified. The autonomists’ 
vision of international affairs is based on the 
principle of strategic autonomy, which implies, 
beside other things, the double autonomy from 
the US and from China, although with natural 
asymmetry in favour of the American ally.  
 
The competition between these two parts of the 
European political establishment has been 
growing for a long time, but recently it has 
 
 





sharpened. The personal factor of the outgoing 
American president played its significant role, but was 
not the fundamental reason. There is also a third 
prominent category of the European political class — 
Eurosceptics of all sorts, but this issue is not a topic of 
the present piece. 
 
The Atlanticists hold that under Joe Biden US-
EU relations should return, figuratively speaking, 
to the times of Barack Obama. The autonomists 
agree that the Biden administration will be much 
more friendly to the EU and NATO, but they 
think that this is not a compelling argument to 
jettison the goal of strategic autonomy. They ask 
a reasonable question: “Fine, under the President 
elect transatlantic ties will regain some strength. 
But what may happen in four years’ time when 
Trump or somebody else like him returns to the 
White House? Let’s become more independent 
whoever is at the helm of power in the US”.  
  
Apparently, a staunch supporter of this approach 
is French President Emmanuel Macron. Paris has 
been exerting its efforts to look and sound 
strategic and to acquire the mantle of the 
European political leadership from Germany. 
Berlin follows an ambitious approach, seemingly 
awaiting the moment when sympathetic rhetoric 
from Biden and his team towards the European 
allies will take the shape of some concrete deeds.  
This caution is well founded, as in 2021 Angela 
Merkel is vacating the post of Chancellor and 
Germany will have elections. Moreover, for 
Berlin the change of the host in the White House 
does not mean that the problem with the final 
stage of construction of Nord Stream 2 will 
somehow ease. This project was the apple of 
discord between Germany and the US under 
Trump, but Biden is also its ardent opponent.  
 
Rome and Madrid are watching the behaviour of 
Paris and Berlin preferring to wait and see. There 
are states in Europe where the victory of Biden 
was met not only with relief but also with mixed 
feelings, even if on the side. Among them the 
UK, Poland, and Hungary. Their ruling forces 
have extracted sufficient profits from Trump’s 
policies. Different variations of Euroscepticism 
have used Trumpism (which is not the same as its 
figure-head) for domestic purposes or as a 
buttress in quarrels inside the EU. Now this 
leverage is not there anymore. 
 
Obviously, a part of Trump’s legacy will be 
dismantled. A question is: to what extent, and what is 
going to replace it? In general, whichever European 
country we take, there are no overwhelming illusions 
that Biden’s presidency can deeply overhaul US 
strategy, which has solidified in the past four years. 
 
Firstly, putting aside the peculiarities of Trump’s 
character and his eccentricity, a lot in US 
behaviour has been quite familiar. It would be 
wrong to say that he is a non-systemic politician, 
as he represents the views and psychology of half 
of the US population, and moreover a significant 
part of the business, political, and military elites. 
Few people disagree that Trump would have won 
the election if not for the pandemic. US policy 
towards the Middle East, excluding Iran, and 
towards China, Russia, and the EU were to a large 
extent a continuation of the previous political 
trends. In a number of cases Trump was over the 
top, but on the whole he was within the broad 
framework of modern US foreign policy.  
 
Secondly, in view of Trumpism’s popularity it 
would be ill-advised to prophesise what kind of a 
political character will move into the White 
House in four years’ time and to insist 
unreservedly that the outgoing presidency was a 
historical aberration. Is there not a chance that 
the presidency of Biden will turn out to be a 
pause before Trumpism and the Republicans, 
who continue to control the Senate, are back in 
the White House?  
 
 





Thirdly, indeed for Europeans Biden will be a more 
convenient counterpart then his predecessor, but not 
necessarily in everything. For example, the president 
elect is an ideologically driven politician to a much 
bigger extent than Trump. Therefore, the overall 
relationship between the US and China will not 
significantly improve, and can even deteriorate 
further. Intensifying Washington — Beijing 
confrontation will make the situation for the EU even 
more difficult than before, placing it between a rock 
and a hard place. Of course, the matter is not just 
Biden’s ideological preferences, but the fact that China 
continues to emerge as the main competitor of the 
US; the pandemic has made this trend only more 
pronounced.  
 
Nor are there writings on the wall about any positive 
shifts in relations between Washington and Ankara. 
On the contrary, the president elect and his most 
ardent European allies may close ranks against 
Ankara, not just on the basis of geopolitics but on the 
issues of human rights and authoritarianism. In this 
case, the state of interaction between Turkey and the 
EU, and the situation in NATO, may go from bad to 
worse.  
 
Clearly, the continuity between the previous and the 
new administration is far from comprehensive. If 
Hillary Clinton or Biden had been the American 
president in the last four years, the US would not have 
abandoned the Paris climate accord, ruined the 
nuclear deal with Iran, blocked the functioning of the 
World Trade Organisation, and withdrawn payments 
to the World Health Organisation. On these issues 
Washington will revamp its policies, which will be 
welcomed in the world. 
 
The niche in which Biden’s victory is expected to 
improve the present realities in Russia-Western 
relations is the sphere of arms control. On the one 
hand, the chain of events which brought the 
destruction of the Intermediate-range nuclear forces 
treaty, was launched by the George W. Bush 
Administration and was followed by Obama. The 
ABM treaty was also scrapped by Bush, and 
deployment of the US/NATO Aegis-Ashore missile 
defence systems has been a constant of the American 
policy. On the other hand, chances are higher that 
under Biden the New START (Strategic arms 
reduction treaty) may be prolonged for the maximum 
period of five years, instead of one year if Trump had 
survived the elections. 
 
Also there is a hope that after 20 January 2021 the new 
presidency will be conducive to the preservation of 
the Open Skies treaty, which the US left on 22 
November. They did not just abandon it, but started 
to press those allies who still abide by the agreement 
de facto to sabotage it. In Russia there is an 
overwhelming consensus that the preservation of 
both the New START and the Open Skies treaty is in 
the national interest of the country.  
 
Apart from that, a possibility exists that starting from 
2021 Russia and the US might find enough political 
will to tackle an awful situation in the sphere of 
conventional arms control in Europe, where Russia 
and NATO military forces face one another. Given 
the tensions in NATO-Russia contact zones, regional 
stabilising measures should be considered. Re-
establishing security dialogue and military contacts are 
urgently needed. There are many specialists and 
former or current state officials in Russia, Europe, and 
the US who adhere to this position. One of the fresh 
products of this thinking process are the 
“Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert 
Dialogue on NATO–Russia Military Risk Reduction 
in Europe”, a document published on 7 December 
2020 and supported by more than 130 well-known 
signatories. 
 
Prof. Dr. Alexey Gromyko Is a Corresponding 
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; 
Director, RAS Institute of Europe; President, 













President Donald Trump's unabashed 
unilateralism has hurt EU-US relations. He has 
called the European Union a “foe” and “worse 
than China, just smaller”. He celebrated Brexit 
and has encouraged other member states to leave 
the bloc. He has bullied democratic leaders such 
as Angela Merkel and embraced autocrats like 
Viktor Orbán. The latter has not helped the EU 
institutions in their search for supranational 
mechanisms to enforce compliance with rule of 
law conditions for membership. 
 
Not only did the 45th US President not re-engage 
with the transatlantic trade and investment 
agenda which Barack Obama abandoned; he 
imposed “national security” tariffs on steel and 
aluminium imports from European allies, and 
threatened that more might follow. He also 
subjected European businesses to American 
extra-territorial jurisdiction more enthusiastically 
than any of his predecessors, in particular over his 
withdrawal of the US from the Iran nuclear deal. 
 
Trump’s retreat from the Paris climate deal, the 
INF treaty, the Open Skies agreement, and the 
WHO as well as his attacks on the WTO have 
rocked many Europeans’ belief that they share 
common ground with their most important ally. 
In fact, Trump has been disdainful of European 
priorities, from climate change or efforts to 
improve global health, to human rights and 
development assistance. 
 
As a result, US relations with the EU have 
become largely dysfunctional, and this at a time 
when unprecedented global health, economic, 
and security challenges demand robust 
transatlantic leadership. 
 
To be sure, transatlantic disarray is not due solely 
to Trump. After more than a decade of crisis 
management, the EU has seemed as likely to fall 
apart as to come together over the COVID-19 
pandemic. The coronavirus crisis has ravaged 
societies and economies. Whereas EU Member 
States reached a political agreement on a historic 
recovery package and a seven-year budget, those 
debates have also revealed ongoing differences 
on rule of law conditionality in the disbursement 
of funding that could widen once the worst of the 
pandemic is over. 
 
…but not beyond repair  
A second term for Trump would have probably 
meant a further erosion of US democracy and the 
post-war liberal order. The EU would have no 
longer been able to put off facing the 
consequences of having an illiberal, anti-trade 
partner across the pond. 
 
With the victory of Joe Biden, there are four years 
to revive an alliance of democracies, face up to 
authoritarian powers and closed economies that 
exploit the openness on which American and 
European societies are built, and shape those 
parts of multilateralism that serve transatlantic 
interests. 
 
During the campaign, candidate Biden 
emphasised that “Europe is the cornerstone of 
our engagement with the world” and “our 
catalyst for global cooperation”. As a passionate 
Transatlanticist and multilateralist, Biden’s first 
instinct will be to turn to the EU as America’s 
indispensable partner of first resort when it 
comes to addressing international challenges. 
 
America, heal thyself before you attend to 
others 
But the President elect’s most immediate 
challenge is likely to be an unenviable confluence 
of crises at home: the ongoing pandemic, deep 
 
 





social tensions, continued recession, and 
astronomical levels of government debt. Joe 
Biden will also have to contend with a much 
stronger radical conservative opposition than 
Barack Obama ever did. This is likely to slow 
down the implementation of his ambitious policy 
agenda. 
 
America’s partners should not be surprised, and 
should in fact welcome, the likelihood that 
Biden’s initial focus will necessarily be on 
domestic challenges. After all, the US is unlikely 
to be the type of consistent, outward-looking 
partner that Europeans need and want if it does 
not beat COVID-19, generate economic growth, 
and work to heal its deep domestic divisions. 
 
Reinvent transatlantic relations 
Even if the US re-joins the WHO, the Paris 
climate accords, the Iran nuclear deal, and works 
to strengthen the WTO, Biden’s foreign policy 
will be more assertive and transactional in 
response to popular domestic demand. 
Europeans should not kid themselves into 
believing that transatlantic relations will return to 
the status quo ante. In all but name, the rallying 
cry of “America First” is here to stay. As a 
presidential candidate, Biden has vowed to 
prioritise investment in US green energy, 
childcare, education, and infrastructure over any 
new trade deals. He has also called for expanded 
“Buy American” provisions in federal 
procurement, which has long been an irritant in 
trade relations with the EU. Also, the EU will 
likely be forced to muster all the political will and 
resources at its disposal to carve a third way 
between the US and China, an issue on which 
there exists strong bipartisan support. 
 
The greatest danger to a vital transatlantic bond 
will be Europe’s temptation to believe that the 
relationship can go back to “business as usual”. 
That would be a mistake. The EU-US alliance as 
we have known it is dead. A Biden administration 
will not want to “restore” the transatlantic 
partnership; it will want to reinvent it for a world 
full of economic, climate, and health challenges, 
more diffuse power, rapid technological changes, 
greater insecurities, and intensified global 
competition. 
 
A reinvented transatlantic partnership will 
demand more, not less, of Europe. The 
European Commission and the EU’s High 
Representative for foreign affairs and security 
policy have understood this. In a call on the US 
to seize a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity to 
forge a new global alliance, they have made a 
detailed pitch to bury the hatchet on the sources 
of tension of the Trump era, and meet the 
“strategic challenge” posed by China. The idea is 
to revitalise the transatlantic partnership by 
cooperating on everything, from fighting 
cybercrime and shaping the digital regulatory 
environment, to screening sensitive foreign 
investments and fighting deforestation. An EU-
US Summit in the first half of 2021 could be the 
moment to launch the new transatlantic agenda. 
 
Coming up with a common approach will hinge 
significantly on the two economies’ ability to 
bridge existing divides over tech policy. Using 
their combined influence, a transatlantic 
technology space could indeed form the 
backbone of a wider coalition of like-minded 
democracies. 
 
Dr. Steven Blockmans is Director of Research 
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The president of the United States making a deal 
with the president of Russia behind Europe’s 
back: that is just one example of something that, 
thanks to Joe Biden’s victory, the European 
Union will not have to worry about for a while.  
 
For a while, for “Trumpism” has been defeated 
but far from destroyed – not with Donald Trump 
winning over 47% of the popular vote. More than 
73 out of 150 million American voters either 
agree with enough of Trump’s views to vote for 
him, or, even if they don’t, somehow find the 
prospect of a Democratic president so abhorrent 
that they pinch their noses and vote for him 
anyway. If the Republican party stays in the hands 
of people like attorney general William Barr and 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who believe that 
the president is above the law in the US, and that 
he can set the law outside the US, another 
authoritarian populist could very well be voted 
into the White House in a next election. Any such 
future “Trumpist” is likely to be far more 
dangerous than Trump himself ever was, if he 
translates Trump’s political instincts into method 
and strategy instead of whims and tweets.  
 
It would be very short-sighted therefore for the 
EU to give up on its objective of strategic 
autonomy. The EU Global Strategy formally 
introduced this objective in June 2016, when 
everybody still thought that Hillary Clinton 
would comfortably win the elections. It was not 
adopted in reaction to Trump’s victory and 
should not be abandoned because of his defeat. 
Strategic autonomy is a European project for the 
coming decades, not for the next American 
presidential term.  
 
 
Yes, Strategic Autonomy  
Strategic autonomy, strategic sovereignty, a pole 
of the multipolar world, a great power: it all 
amounts to the same aspiration – the EU has to 
be an independent global player on a par with the 
US, China, and Russia. Why? Because (1) the EU 
cannot count on any other player to defend the 
European interest in its place, not even on the 
US.  After four years of Trump even the 
staunchest Atlanticist should have understood 
that even the US acts against the European 
interest at times. And because (2) in a world of 
continent-sized great powers, the only way for 
the Europeans to defend their own interests is to 
integrate and achieve the same scale, and that is 
only possible through the EU.  
 
Strategic autonomy does not mean that the EU 
seeks to decouple from the US. The only people 
using that term in earnest are those in the US who 
want to decouple the American economy from 
China. Which is exactly what the EU wants to 
avoid, for such a decoupling could only lead to a 
rivalry without end, an even deeper economic 
recession than the COVID-19 pandemic has 
already caused, and the end of multilateral 
cooperation to solve global problems and 
prevent great power rivalry from escalating. 
Instead, the EU wants to work with all great 
powers to keep multilateralism alive and reform 
it, to maintain a global level economic playing 
field, and to prevent the world from falling apart 
in exclusive spheres of interests and rival blocs.  
 
Rather than put that agenda on ice because Biden 
has been elected, the EU should grasp the chance 
to convince him of it. The EU must pursue its 
own grand strategy regardless of who occupies 
the White House. But a Democratic incumbent is 
an opportunity to do so without causing 
unnecessary friction, first of all, and hopefully in 
far closer cooperation with the US again, so that 
much more can be achieved – before “Trumpism” 
 
 





surges again. Europeans certainly welcomed Biden’s 
announcement that he will re-join the Paris climate 
agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and the World 
Health Organisation. But will the new administration 
embrace a broader agenda of reviving 
multilateralism? Will it continue confronting China 
for the mere reason that it is a peer competitor of the 
US, or will it define more specific strategic objectives 
that leave open the possibility of an accommodation 
with China, provided it observes certain rules?  
 
A lot depends indeed on China’s future behaviour. 
Strategic autonomy was never about equidistance: 
the EU prefers to defend its interest together with 
the US, and is obviously much closer to it than to 
China. If China turns into an aggressive power, the 
EU must ally with the US to halt any expansionist 
designs. But even authoritarian China does have 
legitimate international interests, and the right to 
pursue those in a legitimate way; its success at that 
must be an incentive to do better ourselves, not to 
excoriate China. Will Beijing understand that Biden’s 
victory is a chance for it too? Give those in the EU 
and the US who still believe cooperation is possible 
something to work with, and workable great power 
relations could yet be preserved. Persist in 
obstinately refusing effective reciprocity in economic 
relations, and see the camp that clamours for 
confrontation grow ever stronger.  
  
Ambition not Nostalgia  
Atlanticists tend to decry European strategic 
autonomy as unrealistic. But that is circular 
reasoning: Europe is weak and dependent on the US, 
therefore it is not allowed to express any serious 
ambition, and so it remains forever weak and 
dependent on the US. Will the US forever accept 
that? Again, Trump should have taught Europeans 
otherwise. One may be nostalgic for the transatlantic 
harmony of the past (and it is probably more 
harmonious with hindsight than it looked at the 
time). One must be grateful for the American 
contribution to liberating Europe from Nazism and 
for safeguarding western Europe from Stalinism 
afterwards. But past merit does not excuse today’s 
mistakes, nor does it warrant blind confidence in the 
future. Likewise, the hopeful aim of future Chinese 
good behaviour does not warrant condoning today’s 
transgressions. Strategy is a rational business: one 
must judge each action in its own right, in light of 
one’s interests.  
 
Reason shows, that the EU cannot achieve the same 
degree of strategic autonomy in all areas at once. The 
EU is a global economic power, and it is learning 
how to get better at geo-economics and translate 
economic power into political leverage. Europe’s 
military power is lagging behind. Not mainly, 
however, because it does not spend enough: in 2019, 
the EU-27 spent $214.8 billion on defence, more 
than China ($181 billion) and much more than 
Russia ($48.2 billion). The only reason why the EU 
is not a military power on a par with its economic 
power is because, against reason, its Member States 
so far refuse to apply to defence the same key to 
achieve power: integration. If they would integrate 
their militaries, they could build up an EU pillar of 
NATO that in conventional military terms could 
stand tall on its own. That balance, and not perennial 
subservience, is the key to NATO’s continued 
relevance on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
The EU must actively engage the US as an equal, 
therefore. Europeans can count themselves lucky 
that Joe Biden won. They should not spoil their luck 
and waste the opportunity to advance their agenda. 
on specific niches. 
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